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Abstract
We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with
uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an orga-
nization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization
achieves better coordination in ”attribute matching” but suffers from coordination in ”attribute com-
patibility” and less gains in specialization. The distinctive advantage of the M-form is its flexibility in
choosing between small-scale and full-scale experimentation.
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“Organizations are systems of coordinated action among individuals and groups.”
James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations, 2nd edition, 1993
1 Introduction
Understanding how economic activities are coordinated inside organizations has always been one of the
most fascinating questions in economics. Since Adam Smith, economists have recognized that the benefit of
organizing large-scale production comes from coordinated specialization. When there is no specialization, all
agents perform the same operations, there is then no need for coordination and no gain from having agents
work together in one organization. Coordination becomes crucial whenever there is specialization. On the
other hand, coordination is also costly, which limits the extent of specialization within organizations (Becker
and Murphy, 1992).
In this paper we introduce two types of coordination inside organizations. The first and most impor-
tant one involves attribute matching of specialized tasks, which are complementary to each other. This
concept of coordination is inspired by the notion of “design attributes” first introduced by Milgrom and
Roberts (1990, 1992). While Milgrom and Roberts focus on communication in organizations, we examine
how alternative organizational forms affect coordination when the need for attribute matching is pervasive.
Attribute matching can be understood as assembling complementary parts, such as assembling subroutines
for a software package, synchronizing travel plans and accommodating logistics for a conference, reforming
an economy by restructuring enterprises and establishing corresponding social safety nets and legal institu-
tions, etc. Each complementary part is characterized by its attributes in dimensions such as time, location,
technical specifications, legal and administrative terms, etc. A product or a service is completed successfully
only if the characteristics of each attribute of the various parts are matched. The diameter of a screw must
match that of a bolt so that they both meet certain standards of material resistance. In an assembly line
they must be transported to a given location at a given time. Most products and services require a much
more sophisticated assembling of parts, each part having numerous attributes which are relevant in this
matching process. Failure in the matching of attributes often implies a breakdown. For example, the engine
of a Rolls Royce car cannot fit into the body of a mini-Morris, a software package will not work unless all
the subroutines fit to each other, and a conference will be a disaster if room allocation conflicts with other
academic programs.
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The attribute matching problem is especially pervasive in implementing changes such as innovation and
reform. In these situations, it is not sufficient to match all attributes in blueprints. Blueprints are often
imperfect and incomplete, leaving room for unexpected contingencies. For example, blueprints for reforms
do not specify details of attribute changes, when many of the attributes are not well understood at the
time a blueprint is designed. Attribute mismatches in implementing innovations and reforms, which we call
“attribute shocks,” are thus inevitable.
The second type of coordination refers to the coordination of similar or substitutable tasks, which we call
”attribute compatibility.” This can be understood as coordination within a process such as production of
engines for different types of cars. Car production has a better compatibility if different types of cars share
common parts or services. Although both attribute matching and attribute compatibility are activities of
coordination, there is a conceptual dichotomy between the two in the following sense. It is indispensable
to achieve success in attribute matching because there are drastic consequences when attributes fail to be
matched (Kremer, 1993). However, failing to solve satisfactorily attribute compatibility does not have as
drastic consequences although it involves losses of scale economies or of positive externalities.
The following example of truck production can be used to illustrate this distinction. We may think of truck
production involving two functions: function 1 is to make engines, and function 2 is to make truck bodies.
Suppose there are two truck models, GMC Sierra and Chevrolet Silverado. For each model, the attributes
of engine and the attributes of truck body should be matched. If some attributes between the engine and
the truck body are not matched, the truck cannot operate at all. Suppose a technological innovation in
transmission will make a better truck, but it will require a change in the technical specification for engines.
Coordination in attribute matching is to find a solution to match engines with the new transmission, for each
model. Failure in attribute matching will result in a drastic consequence: the truck with a new transmission
won’t operate. On the other hand, if GMC Sierra and Chevrolet Silverado can share the same transmission,
costs can be lowered, through either reduced production costs or reduced inventory level, which increases
the value from both models. Failure to share transmission between the two models would reduce the value,
but will not stop the truck from operation.
The quality of coordination depends on the quality of communication inside an organization. The com-
munication problem arises because only managers who directly and frequently engage in a particular task
have first-hand information and knowledge about that task. Communication is necessary for others to use
such information and knowledge, but communication is likely to be imperfect because message transmission,
due to technical bugs as well as human misunderstanding, can go wrong. Hayek’s (1945) famous notion of
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“local information,” the information about particular location and circumstance, is relevant here — direct
involvement in a task gives rise to good knowledge about that task.
It is important to note that the communication problem is endogenous, depending on how tasks and
decision-making authority are assigned within an organization. In line with the literature on organization
theory (Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1975), we define an M-form (multi-divisional form) organization as
one that consists of “self-contained units” where complementary tasks are grouped together. In an M-
form organization, units are similar to each other, such as the Oldsmobile Division and Chevrolet Division
in General Motors in the 1930s. In contrast, a U-form (unitary form) organization is decomposed into
“specialized units” where substitutable or similar tasks are grouped together. In a U-form organization,
units are complementary to each other, such as the Sales Department and Manufacturing Department in
Ford Motors in the 1920s. This definition also corresponds to the product-focused (M-form) and process-
focused (U-form) organizational forms in the management literature (see.e.g. Galbraith 1973, Athey and
Schmutzler, 1995).
A simple trade-off emerges between two types of coordination and scale economies. In the self-contained
units of the M-form, local managers can more easily solve the attribute matching problem among comple-
mentary tasks but are less capable of achieving attribute compatibility, and furthermore the advantages of
specialization are not fully appropriated due to the duplication of coordination in attribute matching. In the
U-form organization, local managers can solve attribute compatibility more easily. Moreover, because the
top manager centralizes coordination in attribute matching, economies of scale are obtained. However, the
coordination in attribute matching is harder to solve as the top manager has to rely on imperfect information
about attribute shocks transmitted by local managers.
Beyond the above simple trade-off our model generates two sets of results regarding the dynamic effects
of organizational forms in terms of the patterns of innovation and the performance of organizations. First,
we show that the M-form is able to promote innovation not only through full-scale experimentation but
also through small-scale experimentation, i.e. it can first experiment an innovation in some part of the
organization before implementing it in the entire organization. In this sense the M-form has flexibility in
experimentation. In contrast, the U-form only chooses to engage in full-scale experimentation. It thus lacks
flexibility in experimentation. This difference between the two organizational forms relates to the nature
of the two different types of coordination and the way the tasks are grouped. The reason why the M-form
is capable of carrying out small-scale experimentation is that the complementary tasks are grouped in the
same units so that attribute matching can be carried out by local managers. In contrast, in the U-form, the
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complementary tasks are grouped separately in different units and centralized attribute matching is carried
out across units. We show that small-scale experimentation in the U-form is always dominated by full-scale
experimentation because the former creates complications in attribute matching.
Second, we show that when innovations are more uncertain in the sense that they have a low probability
of success, the M-form is more efficient than the U-form due to its flexibility. In the M-form, small-scale
experimentation gives an option value of waiting to learn about the quality of the blueprint. This reduces the
cost of experimentation. This allows the M-form to engage in innovation in cases where it is not beneficial
to do so for the U-form. The option value of waiting decreases as the probability of success becomes
higher and small-scale experimentation can then be dominated by full-scale experimentation because it
delays experimentation in the rest of the organization. On the other hand, when innovations have a high
probability of success, the U-form is more efficient than the M-form due to economies of scale made possible
by greater specialization. We call this the specialization advantage of the U-form.
We present some evidence from industries in the U.S. in the twentieth century and from the centrally
planned economies in China and the Soviet Union that is consistent with those results.
The notion of M-form and U-form organizations was pioneered by the influential work of Chandler and
Williamson. Chandler (1962, 1977) documented the cases of large American corporations that replaced the
U-form by the M-form in the first half of the 20th century. Later, Williamson (1975, 1985) theorized that the
overload problem of the headquarters was the main problem with the U-form corporation. Following Chandler
and Williamson, some formal studies on the M-form and the U-form organizations have been undertaken.
For example, Aghion and Tirole (1995) analyzed how M-form and U-form organizations generate and solve
the overload problem, and Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) provide an analysis of incentive problems in M-form
and U-form organizations.
In order to focus on the coordination problem, our paper assumes away the incentive problem and takes
the team theoretic approach. The literature on team theory includes, among others, the pioneering work of
Marschak and Radner (1972), Weitzman (1974) on coordination using price and quantity, Crémer (1980) and
Aoki (1986) on the optimal partition of workshops inside an organization, Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)
on the firm as a communication network, Garicano (2000) on the organization of knowledge in production,
in addition to the work by Milgrom and Roberts cited above.
Our paper also relates to the literature on reform strategies in the transition from socialism to capitalism.
While the contrast between “big-bang” approach in Eastern Europe and Russia and the “experimental” ap-
proach in China has been well recognized in the literature (e.g., McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Dewatripont
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and Roland, 1995; Sachs and Woo, 2000), our paper goes one step further to investigate the deeper reasons
of how the pre-reform organizational differences have led different countries to pursue different strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the modeling of task coordination.
Section 3 explores the basic tradeoff in carrying out full-scale experimentation in M-form and U-form.
Section 4 focuses on the comparison between small-scale and full-scale experimentation and the evaluation of
performances in both organizational forms. Section 5 generalizes the model to n products and m processes.
Section 6 derives a set of conditions under which the M-form and the U-form are optimal organizational
forms. Section 7 presents evidence consistent with the predictions of the model. Section 8 concludes.
2 Modelling Task Coordination
Consider an economy with the technology which can be fully described by four tasks: 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B.
Tasks 1A and 2A (similarly tasks 1B and 2B) are complementary to each other, while tasks 1A and 1B
(similarly tasks 2A and 2B) are similar to each other. We denote i = 1, 2 and r = A,B. We can think of
i as "process" or "function" and r as "product" or "region," and task ir corresponds to a task concerning
process i in product r. Later in this paper we will consider the case of i = 1, 2...m and r = 1, 2, ...n, which
corresponds to m processes (or functions) and n products (or regions).
We introduce two types of coordination. The first and most important one involves ”attribute matching”
of the complementary tasks. For example, if 1A and 2A represent respectively the engine and body for a
particular model of a car, attribute matching means the matching of the attributes of the engine and body for
that model. Failure of attribute matching leads to drastic loss of production. The second type of coordination
refers to the coordination of similar or substitutable tasks, which we call ”attribute compatibility.” For
example, similar production processes may be used to produce two types of engines for different models,
and the compatibility between the two processes may help reduce the costs of production. Similar tasks are
often separable: if they are not produced on the same lines, problems on line 1A should not affect production
on line 1B. Failures in attribute compatibility thus should have less drastic effects on production than the
failure on attribute matching in general.
We assume an infinite time horizon and a flow of ideas for experiments over time that have the potential
to improve the output of the organization (but without changing the structure of the organization itself).
Suppose that prior to any experiment, the existing technology generates status quo payoffs of R2 in each
period in product A and product B respectively. With the discount factor δ, the net present value of status
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quo payoffs for the entire organization is given by R1−δ . One successful experiment will raise the payoff from
each product by R2 in each period from the time the experiment is introduced. That is, with a total of i
successful experiments in the past in both products, the net present value of payoffs will be (1+i)R1−δ . The
model assumes that only one experiment can be carried out in each period, but there is no limit on the
total number of experiments to be carried out, that is, experimentation can raise payoffs without bound.
In Appendix 1, we consider an alternative model: instead of assuming a continuous flow of experiment
programs available over time, we allow for only one experiment to be available. If this program is bad or
not successfully implemented, the organization will revert back to the old way.
An experiment faces two potential problems. The first problem concerns the quality of its blueprint. A
blueprint has an uncertain outcome: it can be “good” with probability p and “bad” with probability 1− p.
We assume that blueprints available over time are stochastically independent. Furthermore, if a blueprint
turns out to be good, then it will apply equally well to two products. A good blueprint, together with
correct coordination in implementation, raises the payoff from each product permanently by R2 but a bad
blueprint always reduces the payoff from each product by R2 in every period from the time the reform is
introduced.
The second problem concerns implementation, which involves both attribute matching and attribute
compatibility. On the one hand, even if all attributes are matched perfectly ex ante in the blueprints and
the blueprint is good, unforeseen attribute shocks occur in implementing the blueprint. Attributes must
then be mutually adjusted to observed attribute shocks. In our model, it is possible that the manager
who coordinates is not the manager who collects information about attribute shocks. In such a case, the
coordinating manager relies on the message sent by the manager collecting information. The probability
of each message being correct is λ. With λ ≤ 1, information transmission is generally imperfect. Imperfect
information transmission may arise from the fact that two managers have different idiosyncratic knowledge
and different interpretations of the same message. They may speak different “languages”, for example,
engineering language differs from marketing language. Moreover, their communication may be restricted to
short messages (such as messages carried by phone calls, faxes, memos, meetings, etc.), which may be subject
to ambiguous interpretations. Such noises in information transmission are assumed to be independent across
tasks as well as over time. In our model, imperfect information transmission is the source of failure in
achieving attribute matching, which would lead to a drastic loss of output.
To focus on the coordination issue we assume that obtaining a blueprint is costless whereas implementing
it is not. We assume that attribute matching requires a one time setup cost, which is normalized to C for
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Manager 1
Task 2A Task 2B
Manager 2
Top
Manager
Figure 1: U-form Organizational Structure
two managers (and thus C2 for each manager). This cost can be interpreted as a training cost or learning
cost, that is managers need to be trained to implement a blueprint to learn how to match attributes. The
following assumption ensures that the payoff increase from a good blueprint and good implementation is
worth the setup cost:
Assumption 1 R(1−δ) > C.
We also assume that successful attribute matching for one product cannot be costlessly copied to another
product because of product specific differences. If a blueprint tried in one product is found to be good and
attribute matching is successful, although the same blueprint can be used for another product, separate
coordination is still needed in order to adjust attributes to product specific conditions before a successful
outcome can be achieved.
Failure to achieve attribute compatibility will also lead to a loss of output, although less drastically. For
simplicity, we model attribute compatibility in a reduced form and use s (0 < s ≤ 1) to represent the reduced
payoff due to the lack of attribute compatibility.
We define U-form and M-form organizations according to task assignment as follows. In a U-form
organization, similar tasks are grouped together for the supervision by middle managers. Specifically,
middle manager 1 is responsible for tasks 1A and 1B and middle manager 2 for tasks 2A and 2B. Under the
U-form, attribute compatibility is assured because manager 1 and manager 2 have the perfect information
to do so. However, the two middle managers need to collect information about attribute shocks and send
the information to the top manager, who then matches attributes between tasks 1A and 2A and between 1B
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Figure 2: M-form Oranizational Structure
and 2B. The U-form organization can be represented by Figure 1. It usually corresponds to the partitioning
of the organization according to process or function.
In contrast, in an M-form organization, complementary tasks are grouped together for the supervision by
middle managers. Specifically, middle manager A is responsible for tasks 1A and 2A and middle manager
B for tasks 1B and 2B. Because the two tasks which require attribute matching are assigned to the
same manager, the middle managers can match attributes locally and perfectly. The top manager’s job is
to provide innovation blueprints, to decide the innovation strategy, and to ensure attribute compatibility,
which is not assured due to the lack of information. The M-form organization can be represented by Figure
2. It usually corresponds to the partitioning of the organization according to product or region.
3 M-form vs. U-form: Full-Scale Experimentation
Under the status quo (i.e., no experimentation), the payoff in each period in both the M-form and the U-
form is R, and thus the total payoff in terms of the net present value is given by V S = R1−δwhere δ is the
discount factor. We now calculate the payoffs in the M-form and the U-form under the following strategy
for experimentation: always start an experiment in both units of the organization in each period. We call
this ”full-scale experimentation”. This strategy will be adopted if and only if its payoff is greater than the
payoff from the status quo.
Consider first the U-form. Under the U-form, the two middle managers are responsible for coordinating
attribute compatibility, which is thus always assured. The top manager is responsible for coordinating
attribute matching. He receives four messages through noisy communication, each corresponding to one of
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the four tasks. To simplify the analysis, we assume that all signals for each function are perfectly correlated so
that it is sufficient for a manager to communicate only one signal. When the program is bad, the experiment
fails, and a new program will be tried in the next period. If the program is good, there are two possibilities
due to the assumption of perfect correlation of signals: with probability λ2, attribute matching is successful
for both products A and B; with probability
¡
1− λ2
¢
, attribute matching fails, which gives the same outcome
as a bad program.
Because only the top manager matches attributes, whenever an experiment is introduced, a setup cost
C
2 is paid under the U-form. We define stage i as the stage at which a total of i experiments have been
successfully implemented. At stage i, the current period payoff for the two units without a new experiment
is given by (i+ 1)R. Therefore, at stage i, with a successful new experiment, the current period payoff for
the two units is given by (i+ 2)R. We obtain the recursive formula for the payoff at stage i in terms of the
net present value V UFi :
V UFi = −
C
2
+ p{λ2[(i+ 2)R+ δV UFi+1 ] +
¡
1− λ2
¢
(iR+ δV UFi )}+ (1− p)
¡
iR+ δV UFi
¢
.
Let a = 1
1−(1−λ2p)δ . We have
V UFi = a[−
C
2
+ λ2p (i+ 2)R+
¡
1− λ2p
¢
iR+ λ2pδV UFi+1 ]
= −aC
2
+ 2λ2paR+ aRi+ aλ2pδV UFi+1 .
From the above recursive formula, we calculate
V UFo = −a
C
2
∞X
i=0
¡
aλ2pδ
¢i
+ 2λ2paR
∞X
i=0
¡
aλ2pδ
¢i
+ aR
∞X
i=0
i
¡
aλ2pδ
¢i
,
where V UFo is finite because aλ
2pδ = λ
2pδ
1−(1−λ2p)δ < 1 for all δ < 1.
Using formulae
P∞
i=1 ix
i = x
(x−1)2 and
P∞
i=0 x
i = 11−x , and the fact that
a
1−aλ2pδ =
1
1−δ , we obtain the
payoff at stage 0:
V UFo = −
C
2(1− δ) +
pλ2R
1− δ
µ
2 +
δ
(1− δ)
¶
.
Consider now the M-form. Whenever an experiment program is introduced, setup costs 2(C2 ) = C must
be incurred because two managers are involved in coordination. Because each unit manager is responsible
for attribute matching, perfect attribute matching can always be achieved. However, attribute compatibility
can be a problem since similar tasks are grouped separately in different units. We thus assume that with a
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new experiment, the current period payoff for the two units is given by (i+ 1 + s)R, where sR represents
the incremental payoff due to the new experiment and s ≤ 1 is due to lack of attribute compatibility in the
current period. To keep the analysis simple, we assume s is a deterministic parameter.
The payoff VMFi can then be written recursively as follows:
VMFi = −C + p[(i+ 1 + s)R+ δVMFi+1 ] + (1− p) [iR+ δVMFi ].
We can see that VMFi is similar to V
UF
i except that
C
2 is replaced by C, λ
2 by 1 and we now have i+ 1 + s
instead of i+ 2. We then analogously obtain:
VMFo = −
C
1− δ +
pR
1− δ
µ
(1 + s) +
δ
(1− δ)
¶
.
Because the status quo payoff is V S = R1−δ , we define the critical value p
MF such that VMFo =
R
1−δ and
the critical value pUF such that V UFo =
R
1−δ . This yields p
MF = (R+C)(1−δ)R[(1+s)(1−δ)+δ] and p
UF =
(R+C2 )(1−δ)
λ2R(2−δ) .
Hence the M-form adopts a strategy of full-scale experimentation if and only if p > pMF and the U-form
adopts the full-scale experimentation strategy if and only if p > pUF . It is easy to obtain:
Proposition 1: If pMF < pUF , which happens when communication quality λ is low, or compatibility s is
high, or the setup cost C is low, then for all p ∈ [pMF , pUF ] the M-form chooses full-scale experimentation
but the U-form does not and the M-form yields a higher payoff than the U-form. If pMF > pUF , the reverse
is true.
Proposition 1 illustrates the basic trade-off: the U-form has the advantage in specialization and attribute
compatibility but suffers from the attribute matching problem, whereas the M-form achieves better attribute
matching but suffers from the lack of attribute compatibility and less specialization. In particular, when
communication quality is perfect (λ = 1) , then pMF > pUF always holds and the U-form yields a higher
payoff. Indeed, the U-form will experiment more because its gains from specialization reduce the costs of
experimentation in the whole organization. On the other hand, when the setup cost is trivial (C = 0) and
attribute compatibility is not an issue (s = 1), then pMF ≤ pUF always holds and the M-form will experiment
more. In this case, the advantage from specialization plays no role and the U-form may suffer from the
attribute matching problem. Proposition 1 follows quite directly from our assumptions but it formalizes
some of the basic trade-offs identified in the organization literature.
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4 M-form vs. U-form: Small-Scale and Full-Scale Experimenta-
tion
In this section we study the M-form and the U-form under small-scale experimentation strategies in compar-
ison to the full-scale experimentation in the previous section. We first consider the small-scale experimen-
tation strategy under the M-form: start an experiment in one of the two units and extend it to the other
unit in the next period only if it is a success. We assume that a small-scale experiment causes attribute
compatibility problems not only to the experimenting unit but also to the non-experimenting unit.1
Let Vi be the payoff in terms of the net present value at stage i. Let a new experiment program start
in unit A but not in unit B at stage i. We call unit A the experimenting unit. The setup cost in the
current period is C2 because only unit A’s manager coordinates. There are now two possibilities. If the
program is good, the current period payoff is (i+1+s)R2 in unit A and
(i+s)R
2 in unit B. In the next period,
the previous successful experiment program can be used in unit B after a setup cost C2 is paid (because unit
B’s manager needs to match attributes) and unit A will try a new experiment program. If the program is
bad, the current period payoff is iR2 in the experimenting unit A and is
(i+s)R
2 in the non-experimenting unit
B. In the next period, a new experiment will again be introduced in unit A. We thus calculate the payoff
under this strategy VMSi as follows:
VMSi = −
C
2
+ p
½
(i+ 1 + s)R
2
+
(i+ s)R
2
− δC
2
+ δVMSi+1
¾
+ (1− p)
½
iR
2
+
(i+ s)R
2
+ δVMSi
¾
,
or let a = 11−(1−p)δ
VMSi = − (1 + pδ)
C
2
+ p
µ
2 + s
2
R+ iR+ δVMSi+1
¶
+ (1− p)
µ
sR
2
+iR+ δVMSi
¶
= − (1 + pδ) C
2
+ (i+ 1)R+
R
2
(2p− 2 + s) + pδVMSi+1 + (1− p) δVMSi
= a
µ
− (1 + pδ) C
2
+ (i+ 1)R+
R
2
(2p− (2− s))
¶
+ apδVMSi+1
Then we have
1An alternative assumption is that a small-scale experiment causes an attribute compatibility problem only to the experi-
menting unit, which causes less damage than under our above assumption. The results under the alternative assumption are
qualitatively similar.
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VMSo = a
µ
− (1 + pδ) C
2
+
R
2
(2p− (2− s))
¶ ∞X
i=0
(apδ)i + aR
∞X
i=0
(i+ 1) (apδ)i
=
1
1− δ
µ
− (1 + pδ) C
2
+
R
2
(2p− (2− s))
¶
+
Ã
pδR
(1− δ)2
+
R
1− δ
!
=
− (1 + pδ)C
2(1− δ) +
R
1− δ
µ
s
2
+
p
1− δ
¶
.
Hence we have
Proposition 2 Under the M-form, the payoff difference between the small-scale and the full-scale experi-
mentation strategy is given by VMSo − VMFo = 11−δ
¡
(1− pδ)C2 + (
1
2 − p)Rs
¢
. The relative advantage of the
small-scale over the full-scale strategy is larger when p is smaller, or C is larger. The relative advantage is
also larger when s is smaller if p > 12 , and when s is larger if p <
1
2 .
The first term (1−pδ)C2(1−δ) indicates the option value of waiting to learn about the quality of the blueprint
before sinking C2 in the other unit of organization. This option value of waiting increases as p decreases.
Therefore, small-scale experimentation can save on setup costs. This is reminiscent of the option value of
early reversal of a bad blueprint in the case of many reforms tried out sequentially rather than together in
a country (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). The second term (
1
2−p)R
1−δ is negative when p >
1
2 and positive
when p < 12 . When p >
1
2 , there is a cost of delaying experimentation in the non-experimenting unit B.
This cost decreases as p decreases, and overall, the comparative advantage of small-scale experimentation
increases as p decreases. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the option value of waiting and the cost
of delaying the experiment in the other unit of the organization. In the extreme case when p = 1, we have
VMSo − VMFo = C2 −
R
2(1−δ) for s = 1, which is negative by Assumption 1. In other words, there is no
advantage of small-scale experimentation. When p < 12 , then there is no cost from delaying the experiment
in the non-experimenting unit B. On the contrary, experimenting would lead to a one period expected
disruption because of the low probability of success. Then, there is no trade-off any more: small-scale
experimentation yields both the option value of waiting and the gains from a smaller expected disruption
(restricted to one unit) compared to large-scale experimentation. If C = 0, the first term vanishes and the
second term alone determines the relative advantage of small-scale over full-scale strategy. It can go either
way, depending on whether p is smaller or larger than 12 .
It is easy to calculate that ∂∂pV
MF
o =
R
1−δ (1 + s +
1
1−δ ) and
∂
∂pV
MS
o =
1
1−δ (
R
1−δ −
δC
2 ). We thus have
∂
∂pV
MF
o >
∂
∂pV
MS
o . By Assumption 1, we must also have
∂
∂pV
MS
o > 0. We define p
∗ such that VMFo
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= VMSo , that is (1 − p∗δ)C2 = (p∗ −
1
2)Rs, from which we solve for p
∗ = C+RsδC+2Rs . Hence we always
have p∗ > 12 . Therefore, the small-scale experimentation strategy yields a higher payoff than the full-scale
experimentation strategy (i.e., VMSo > VMFo ) if and only if p < p∗.
Now we define the critical value pMS such that VMSo = V S =
R
1−δ , where
R
1−δ is the status quo payoff.
We derive that pMS = ((2−s)R+C)(1−δ)2R−δ(1−δ)C
Under the M-form, the organization has three possible strategies: the status quo, small-scale experimen-
tation and full-scale experimentation. Therefore, the overall payoff under the M-form is given by
VMo = max
©
V S , VMSo , V
MF
o
ª
= max
½
R
1− δ ,−
(1 + pδ)C
2(1− δ) +
R
1− δ
µ
s
2
+
p
1− δ
¶
,− C
1− δ +
pR
1− δ
µ
(1 + s) +
δ
(1− δ)
¶¾
.
Proposition 3 Under the M-form, the small-scale experimentation strategy yields a higher payoff than
the full-scale experimentation strategy if and only if p < p∗. Furthermore, the small-scale experimentation
strategy yields a higher payoff than the status quo while the full-scale experimentation strategy yields a lower
payoff than the status quo if and only if p ∈
¡
pMS , pMF
¢
.
Proof From Assumption 1 we can easily derive pMS < pMF < p∗. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 shows that the advantage of small-scale experimentation is present for low levels of p.
Moreover, even when the likelihood of success is sufficiently low that a large-scale experimentation yields
lower payoffs than the status quo, small-scale experimentation can still be profitable because it reduces the
downside of experimentation. This result shows that the option of small-scale experimentation under the
M-form is valuable for low values of p (though not necessarily lower than 12).
We now consider possible small-scale experimentation strategies under the U-form where change is done
first in one unit and, if successful, implemented in both units the next period. Assume thus that small-scale
experimentation involves adopting an experiment for tasks 1A and 1B in unit 1, and if successful, in the next
period it is extended to tasks 2A and 2B in unit 2. Again, attribute compatibility is assured. This kind of
experimentation is more difficult to imagine in the real world. Our model will indeed predict (Proposition
4 below) that we should not see such type of experimentation since it is always dominated by large-scale
experimentation.2
2To illustrate this in an easy way, think of changes in computer softwares including an operating system and applications.
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We assume that the quality of the program (good or bad) can be discovered even when the experiment is
implemented for only one task. We further assume that in order to match attributes of two tasks, whenever
there is a change in at least one task, information (and thus communication) about the attributes of both
tasks is needed. This is because even if a change is introduced in one task, attribute matching always involves
another task. Therefore, under U-form with change in only one unit, all messages corresponding to the four
tasks must be communicated by the two middle managers to the top manager.
We can write the recursive formula for the payoff at stage i in terms of the net present value V USi :
V USi = −
C
2
+ pλ2{(i+ 1 + 1
2
)R+ δ[−C
2
+ λ2(i+ 2)R+ (1− λ2)iR+ δV USi+1 ]}+
¡
1− pλ2
¢
(iR+ δV USi )},
from which we derive
V US0 = −
C
2(1− δ) +
pλ2R
(1− δ)(1 + pλ2R)
µ
3
2
+ 2λ2δ +
δ2
1− δ
¶
.
We want to compare this with V UFo = − C2(1−δ) +
pλ2R
1−δ
³
2 + δ(1−δ)
´
.
Note that the experimentation strategy does not save in set-up costs, and V US0 and V UF0 differ only in
their expected benefits. However, comparing both expressions for expected benefits is not trivial. We
do the comparison by first constructing an alternative strategy of full-scale experimentation gUF in which
after a success with a new experiment, the organization will keep that program for an additional period and
try a new program only one period later. Otherwise, the strategy is the same as in the original full-scale
experimentation strategy. We label the payoffs from this strategy V?UF0 . This strategy is constructed to be
inferior to UF . We show below that it dominates US and therefore UF must dominate US.
Proposition 4 Under the U-form, the small-scale experimentation strategy always yields lower payoffs than
the full-scale experimentation strategy (i.e., V UF0 > V US0 whenever V US0 > V S).
Proof First we show that the constructed strategy V?UF0 > V US0 for all parameters. We can write the
recursive formula for the payoff at stage i in terms of the net present value V?UF0 :
V?UF0 = −
C
2
+ pλ2{(i+ 2)R+ δ[(i+ 2)R+ δV?UFi+1 ]}+
¡
1− pλ2
¢
(iR+ δV?UFi ),
Here task 1 represents changes in the operating system and task 2 represents changes in the word processor. Small-scale
experimentation under this strategy means, for example, first changing the operating system (say from DOS to Windows),
and then changing the word processor (from WordPerfect 5.1 to WordPerfect 6). Coordination involves first matching the
attributes of the old word processor with the new operating system (via a solution like the ”DOS prompt”) and then matching
the attributes of the new operating system with the new word processor.
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from which we calculate the value of V?UF0 as follows:
V?UF0 = −
C
2(1− δ)(1 + pλ2R)
+
pλ2R
(1− δ)(1 + pλ2R)
µ
2(1 + δ) +
δ2
1− δ
¶
.
We get that V US0 − V
?UF
0 = − pλ
2R
(1−δ)(1+pλ2R)
¡C+1
2 + 2(1− λ
2)δ
¢
< 0.
We now verify that V UF0 > V
?UF
0 whenever V
?UF
0 > V
S . The condition for V?UF0 > V
S is given by
V?UF0 = −
C
2(1− δ)(1 + pλ2R)
+
pλ2R
(1− δ)(1 + pλ2R)
µ
2(1 + δ) +
δ2
1− δ
¶
>
R
1− δ ,
which is equivalent to p > (
C
2 +R)(1−δ)
λ2R(1+δ−δ2) .We calculate that V
UF
o > V
?UF
0 if and only if
− C
2(1− δ) +
pλ2R
1− δ
µ
2 +
δ
(1− δ)
¶
> − C
2(1− δ)(1 + pλ2R)
+
pλ2R
(1− δ)(1 + pλ2R)
µ
2(1 + δ) +
δ2
1− δ
¶
,
and if and only if p > (
C
2 +R)(1−δ)
λ2R(2−δ) .Because
1
(1+δ−δ2) >
1
(2−δ) , then whenever V
?UF
0 > V S , we must have
V UF0 > V
?UF
0 .
Let V US0 > V
S . We have shown above that V?UF0 > V
US
0 . We have also shown that V
UF
0 > V
?UF
0 .
Therefore, we have V UF0 > V
?UF
0 > V
US
0 . Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 states that, contrary to the M-form, the U-form organization does not benefit from the
small-scale experimentation strategy. What are the reasons for this? First, there is no economy in saving
expected setup costs as in the M-form. Indeed, the setup cost is not lower than under full-scale experimenta-
tion. Second, separately and more importantly, there are complications in coordinating activities and some
of these complications are present even when λ = 1, i.e. when communication is perfect. The proof of propo-
sition 4 gives us a good intuition for why. We showed first that the small-scale experimentation strategy was
dominated by a full-scale experimentation strategy gUF whereby one would wait one period before trying a
new experiment. To see why this is the case, it is useful to compare term by term the recursive formulas
for V US0 and V
?UF
0 derived above. We see that the small-scale experimentation strategy 1) has a smaller
first period benefit in case of a successful experiment, 2) has to incur an additional setup cost for the second
stage of attribute matching, and 3) has to suffer losses from imperfect communication due to the need for
attribute matching in the second round. All the three factors point to the disadvantage of V US0 relative to
V?UF0 . In addition, by construction, gUF is dominated by UF because in the former when an experiment is
successful it takes two periods rather than one before trying out a new one. Therefore, the U-form is less
flexible in terms of small scale experimentation.
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Note that small-scale experimentation is dominated by the full-scale experimentation in the U-form
for all values of p whereas in the M-form it is dominated only for high values of p. The reason is that
under small-scale experimentation the M-form has a smaller payoff in case of success, relative to full-scale
experimentation, but a higher one in case of failure, because the status quo payoff is maintained in the
non-experimenting unit. In the U-form, however, there is similarly a lower payoff in case of success but no
advantage in case of failure. This is because the status quo payoff cannot be maintained in the unit where
the old attributes are kept.
The fundamental reason that small-scale experiment is always dominated by full-scale experiment under
the U-form is the complications in attribute matching under the U-form, which in turn is related to the way
the tasks are grouped under the U-form: the complementary tasks are grouped separately in different units
and attribute matching must be solved across units. Under small-scale experimentation, it is necessary
for the U-form to coordinate in two steps: the first step between the new tasks in unit 1 and the old
tasks in unit 2 and the second step between the new tasks in units 1 and 2. In contrast, under the M-
form, the complementary tasks are grouped in the same units. At the time a successful experiment in
unit A is replicated in unit B, unit A can already start a next experiment. Although coordination failure in
attribute compatibility causes some losses in scale economy or positive externalities, it does not lead to drastic
consequences as in coordination failure in attribute matching. This asymmetry in coordination of attribute
matching and attribute compatibility explains the different results concerning small-scale experimentation
in the M-form and the U-form.
In the above discussion of small-scale experimentation we have compared the M-form and U-form orga-
nizations where one unit within the organization experiments. What about a small-scale experiment across
units? One could imagine, for example, the U-form replicating M-form style experimentation by implement-
ing an experiment between task 1A in unit 1 and task 2A in unit 2. For the sake of completeness, we develop
this case in Appendix 2. The result there shows that on the one hand, contrary to the M-form and like the
case with the U-form, there is no option value of waiting from small-scale experimentation. This means that
the option value of waiting advantage of small-scale experimentation is unique to the M-form. On the other
hand, like the M-form, small-scale experimentation can dominate large-scale experimentation when p and λ
are small. However, we think that this type of cross-unit experimentation is less realistic. One can think
of at least two important reasons for why this may be the case. First, if the U-form has the advantage of
specialization and absence of duplication, it is reasonable to think that there are technological indivisibility
involved between tasks 1A and 1B so that for example the same production line or equipment is used for
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both tasks. We have not modelled explicitly such indivisibility but one can argue that such indivisibility
is a reason for a specialization advantage and thus for lower operating costs in the U-form. A second and
probably more important reason is related to the limited attention of management. If we assume that 1) in
the absence of innovation, management must pay attention to current operations, and 2) attribute matching
in the event of innovation requires full attention of management, and 3) attribute matching on a larger scale
requires the same attention as on a smaller scale, then if half of each unit in the U-form is experimenting
while the other half is not, the top management will have an overload problem. This is because he would
focus on attribute matching in half of each unit and at the same time pay attention to current operation in
the other half, which might be too much given that his attention is limited. Note that this limited attention
argument is very close to Williamson’s argument about overload in the U-form (Aghion and Tirole, 1995
also studied the overload problem in a model of incentives in organizations).
When small-scale experimentation is ruled out under the U-form, as a consequence of Proposition 4, the
organization has only two possible strategies: the status quo and the full-scale experimentation strategy.
The overall payoff under the U-form is given by
V Uo = max
©
V S , V UFo
ª
= max
½
R
1− δ ,−
C
2(1− δ) +
pλ2R
1− δ
µ
2 +
δ
(1− δ)
¶¾
.
We define ep such that V UFo = VMSo for λ = 1, that is,
− C
2(1− δ) +
epR
1− δ
µ
2 +
δ
(1− δ)
¶
= −(1 + epδ)C
2(1− δ) +
R
1− δ
µ
s
2
+
ep
1− δ
¶
,
from which we solve for ep = Rs2R+δC . Therefore, we must have ep < 12 < p∗.
We are now ready to compare the M-form and the U-form when all possible experimentation strategies
are allowed. When C = 0, clearly the M-form under full-scale experimentation already has higher payoffs
than the U-form simply because the former avoids the cost disadvantage. With the possibility of small-
scale experimentation strategy, the M-form can do even better for p < 12 . In the following discussion we
assume C > 0. First, consider the case when the communication quality λ is low. From Proposition 1,
we learned that if we restrict the experimenting strategy to full-scale experimentation, then the M-form has
an advantage over the U-form. With the possibility of small-scale experimentation, the advantage of the
M-form over the U-form can only be further strengthened. This is because by Proposition 3, the M-form
with small-scale experimentation strategy can do better than full-scale experimentation for p ∈
¡
pMS , pMF
¢
.
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Figure 3: Experiment strategy comparison when λ is low.
At the same time, by Proposition 4, small-scale experimentation does not help the U-form at all. Figure 3
illustrates this case of low λ, where the slope of V UFo is flatter than that of VMFo . The advantage of the
M-form is related to better communication within the organization.
Next consider the case when communication quality λ is high. Proposition 1, restricted to full-scale
experimentation showed that the U-form has an advantage over the M-form. But with the introduction of
the possibility of small-scale experimentation, even in the case when λ is high, the M-form will still have an
advantage over the U-form in using small-scale experimentation if p is relatively low:
Proposition 5 Assume C > 0. When the quality of communication λ is high, provided δ is large, the
M-form (with the optimal strategy of small-scale experimentation) yields a higher payoff than the U-form
(with the optimal strategy of full-scale experimentation) for all p ∈ [pMS , ep]. The reverse is true for all
p ∈ [ep, 1].
Proof Proposition 4 showed that the dominant strategy under the U-form is full-scale experimentation.
Note also that when λ is close to 1, V UFo ≥ VMFo with strict inequality for C > 0. Indeed, an inspection of
the expressions for V UFo and VMFo shows that the expected benefits are the same while the expected costs
are lower for V UFo . All we need to do is thus to compare VMSo and V UFo . We first see that pMS < ep when δ
approaches 1. Moreover, we find that when λ is close to 1, ∂V
MS
o
∂p =
1
1−δ (
R
1−δ −
δC
2 ) <
R
1−δ (2+
δ
1−δ ) =
∂V UFo
∂p .
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Figure 4: Experiment strategy comparison when λ is high
By definition of ep and because of the higher slope of ∂V UFo∂p , we thus conclude that for all p ∈ [pMS , ep],
VMSo > V UFo and the reverse is true for all p ∈ [ep, 1]. Q.E.D.
Figure 3 illustrates this case of high λ where the slope of V UFo is very close to that of V
MF
o when s is
close to 1. Proposition 5 is interesting because it shows that the M-form can do better than the U-form
even when communication quality is very high in the U-form, i.e. when λ approaches 1. This is because the
flexibility of the M-form in terms of small-scale experimentation allows it to experiment even when p is small.
Although the U-form has an advantage of specialization to avoid the duplication of setup costs, it does not
have the flexibility of carrying out experiments in only part of the organization. The fundamental reason
why the M-form has that flexibility is precisely its organizational duplication: each unit is self contained
and coordination is carried out locally by more than one manager. While economists traditionally tend to
emphasize the importance of specialization for efficiency, there is the other side of the coin: specialization may
create rigidity which can be bad for experimentation. The M-form can thus do better due to its flexibility
in experimentation in self-contained units which is an advantage when p is low. Otherwise, for higher values
of p , the U-form still can do better because of its advantage in specialization.
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5 Generalization
We now generalize the above model to n products and m processes. We normalize the setup cost of imple-
menting an experiment under the M-form to C and that under the U-form to Cn . The status quo payoff of the
entire organization is R1−δ (or equivalently
R
n(1−δ) in each product). We assume away attribute compatibility
problem so that s = 1 for simplicity.
Consider the M-form first. The organization has n units along product lines. Within each unit, a middle
level manager is responsible for coordinating m tasks within the product and perfect coordination is always
achieved. Let α be the fraction of experimenting units where α ∈
£
1
n , 1
¤
.
The net present value payoff in stage i under the M-form:
Vi = −αC + p {(i+ 1)R+ αR− δ (1− α)C + δVi+1}+ (1− p) {(i+ 1)R− αR+ δVi} .
Recall that a = 11−(1−p)δ . We then obtain:
VMαo = a[− (α+ pδ (1− α))C + αR (2p− 1)]
∞X
i=0
(apδ)i + aR
∞X
i=0
(i+ 1) (apδ)i .
= −α+ (1− α) pδ
1− δ C +
R
1− δ
µ
α (2p− 1) + 1 + pδ
1− δ
¶
Let p∗ = C+RCδ+2R . Under Assumption 1, p
∗ < 1. Therefore, we have the following result, which is parallel
to the first part of Proposition 3:
Proposition 6 When an experimentation strategy is preferred to the status quo, the M-form’s optimal strat-
egy is full-scale experimentation strategy if p > p∗and the small-scale experimentation strategy to experiment
in just one product if p < p∗.
Proof Note that VMαo is linear in α, and
∂
∂αV
Mα
o = −1−pδ1−δ C +
R
1−δ (2p− 1) . At p = p∗,
∂
∂αV
Mα
o = 0. For
p > p∗, VMαo is an increasing function in α, therefore the optimal α is 1. For p < p∗, VMαo is a decreasing
function in α, therefore the optimal α is 1n . Q.E.D.
Therefore, the payoff under the M-form is given by
VMo =
⎧
⎨
⎩
max
©
V S , VMαo
ª
where α = 1, for p ≥ p∗
max
©
V S , VMαo
ª
where α = 1n , for p < p
∗
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
max{ R1−δ ,− C1−δ + pR1−δ
³
2 + δ1−δ
´
}, for p ≥ p∗
max{ R1−δ ,− C1−δ (1+(n−1)pδn ) + R1−δ
³
2p+n−1
n +
pδ
1−δ
´
}, for p < p∗
.
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Because VMo is not a function of m, any change in m has no effect in the M-form. Consider the
situation where the status quo is dominated by experimentation. When p > p∗, the optimal α = 1, a
change in n has no effect on in the M-form. When p < p∗. Then the optimal α = 1n , and
∂VMo
∂n =
1
(1−δ)n2 (R+ C − p (Cδ + 2R)) , so an increase in n has a positive effect in the M-form.
In the U-form, the organization has m units along process lines. Within each unit, a middle level
manager is responsible for collecting information about attribute shocks and sending a message to the top
manager. The top manager receives correct information with probability λm and coordinates m tasks for
all n products. In the U-form organization, with full-scale experimentation, the payoff in stage i is given
by:
V Uo = −
C
n
+ p{λm[(i+ 2)R+ δVi+1] + (1− λm) (iR+ δVi)}+ (1− p) (iR+ δVi) .
= − C
n(1− δ) +
pλmR
1− δ
µ
2 +
δ
(1− δ)
¶
It is easy to see that in the U-form, an increase in the number of processes m has a negative effect and
an increase in the number of products n has a positive effect, independently of the value of p and λ.
Because ∂V
U
o
∂n =
C
(1−δ)n2 , a simple comparison of
∂
∂nV
UF
o and
∂
∂nV
M
o demonstrates that for p < p∗ an
increase in the number of products n has a larger positive effect in the U-form than in the M-form if and
only if p > ep.
6 Conditions for the Optimality of M-Form and U-Form
In this section, we provide a set of conditions under which the M-form and the U-form dominate other
organizational forms so that our focus on these two forms can be justified. We restrict our attention to the
case of two products and two processes only, but the underlying principle is general.
Figure 5 illustrates possible types of organizational forms in the case of two products and two processes.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) are the U-form and the M-form respectively. Figure 5(c) is the flat organizational form
in which all coordination is done by one manager. Figures 5(d) and 5(e) are skewed organizational forms
where one middle manager coordinates two or three tasks and the top manager coordinates the residual
task(s). Figure 5(f) is a symmetric form but represents a different partition of tasks than the M-form or
U-form. Figure 5(g) is a stand alone organizational form without middle managers. Other alternatives not
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present in Figure 5 are cases where one manager is responsible for one task only. With more than two
products and two processes there are more possibilities but the two by two case serves as a good illustration.
We assume that in an organization there are the following distinct types of knowledge: knowledge on
process and knowledge on products related to identifying/describing attribute shocks; and knowledge on
blueprints related to strategic decisions (selection of blueprints). We further assume that each manager can
acquire only one type of knowledge. This is because the capacity of human beings to acquire knowledge is
limited and the character of knowledge is specialized. Formally, we make the following assumption about
the knowledge of a manager:
Assumption K A manager’s knowledge is limited to one of the following:
(K1) process for any given product;
(K2) product for any given process;
(K3) blueprints.
Moreover, we suppose that as long as information on attribute shocks is known coordinating-task per se
does not rely on knowledge (K1), (K2) and (K3).
We first demonstrate that both the M-form and U-form satisfy Assumption K. Under the M-form,
the top manager engages in strategic decisions, which requires knowledge (K3). Each of the two middle
managers engages in collecting attribute shock information and coordinates tasks accordingly in his own
units. The information collection and task coordination within a unit require knowledge (K1). Therefore,
Assumption K is satisfied. Under the U-form, each of the two middle managers is responsible for one of the
two processes respectively; and each of them collects information on attribute shocks associated with that
process in the two products requiring knowledge (K2); and transmits the information to the top manager.
The top manager then coordinates, which does not rely on knowledge (K1) or (K2). Moreover, the top
manager takes up strategic decisions requiring knowledge (K3). Again, Assumption K is satisfied. In both
of these organizational forms, the number of managers hired for the entire organization is 3.
Because any organization requires all three types of knowledge to run, Assumption K rules out any
organizational form employing fewer than 3 managers. Organizational forms (c), (d), (e) and (g) all employ
1 or 2 managers and thus violate Assumption K.
Among all organizational forms employing 3 managers the M-form and the U-form organizations are the
only ones that satisfy Assumption K. In the organizational form (f) in Figure 5, one manager is responsible
for tasks 1A and 2B, and the other for tasks 1B and 2A. This would imply that each of them must have
both knowledge (K1) and (K2), a violation of Assumption K.
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Figure 5: General Oranizational Forms
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Therefore, all the organizational forms satisfying Assumption K other than the M-form and the U-form
must hire more than 3 managers. If we assume that hiring additional managers entails additional costs,
then an organizational form that employs more than 3 managers does not have a cost advantage over an
organizational form that employs only 3 managers. When this cost is sufficiently high, it rules out an
organizational form such as for example 4 managers each responsible for collecting information on one region
and one function only and an additional manager for strategic decisions.
To conclude, under Assumption K and assuming costly managers, the M-form and the U-form are the
only optimal organizational forms. A more complete analysis of the optimality of different organizational
forms deriving from primitive assumptions is beyond the scope of this paper but is an important avenue for
further research.
7 Evidence
Our model has two major predictions related to the probability of success p and organizational forms. First,
Proposition 5 makes a prediction on the relative efficiency of the two organizational forms in innovation:
when the probability of success p is low, the M-form is more efficient due to its flexibility in small and full scale
experimentation; when p is high, the U-form is more efficient due to its specialization advantage. Second,
Propositions 3 and 4 spell out predictions on the experimentation strategies of the two organizational forms:
the M-form conducts small-scale experiments when p is low and conducts full-scale experiments otherwise,
whereas the U-form only conducts full-scale experiment if conducting experiments at all.
We first provide two pieces of evidence on the first prediction. In the market economy, more efficient
organizational forms in firms are observed as a result of competition. In the 20th century, innovations in
the metal industry and in the railroad industry were mostly incremental. For example, markets for metal
products were more standardized and there was less change since most customers were firms rather than
households (they had “relatively few large customers [...] (and) manufactured many standardized products”
(p.327, Chandler, 1962)). By contrast, the automotive industry and the chemical industry have faced
drastic innovations, with revolutionary new products, expanding new markets, and new consumer goods.
In terms of our model, one can argue that the metal industry faced incremental innovations with relatively
low uncertainty and a relatively high probability of success p. In contrast, the automotive industry and
chemical industry were experimenting with more bold innovations under higher conditions of uncertainty
and thus one can reasonably argue that they faced a lower p. The model predicts that we should observe
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more U-form firms in the metal industry but more M-form firms in the car and chemical industries. Indeed,
Chandler (1962, 1977) documents that the M-form has become the dominant organizational form in large
U.S. corporations both in the car industry (e.g. GM) and the chemical industry (e.g. Du Pont), while
the sectors that did not introduce the M-form were concentrated in the metal industries. For example,
the copper and nickel companies have kept their functionally departmentalized structures, and the steel
companies even increased centralization over time. In the steel industry, five out of eight large steel makers
in the U.S. have kept the U-form structure. In the other three companies (Armco, National Steel, US Steel),
there was a trend to move to the U-form. US Steel, the largest steel maker in the U.S. was reorganized into
a functionally departmentalized structure in 1950. “All activities administered by Central Operations were
departmentalized along functional lines. A single set of Executive Vice Presidents became ... responsible
for the administration of their different functions in every part of the corporation” (Chandler, pp. 334-335,
1962). Such Executive Vice-presidents were responsible for Production, Sales, and Engineering respectively.
Under each of the Executive Vice Presidents, there were Vice Presidents responsible for further specialized
functions. For example, under the Executive Vice President for Sales, there were Vice Presidents for Sales,
Warehousing-organization, etc. respectively.
Our next example concerns the comparison of two centrally planned economies: the Soviet Union and
China. The structure of the Soviet economy as a whole is similar to a U-form corporation along functional
lines. At the top was the Gosplan. Under this central authority there were seven industrial complexes,
each in turn supervising several ministries specializing in one particular industry. Therefore the Soviet
economy can be viewed as a gigantic U-form coordinating specialized production in the whole economy.
Indeed, the Gosplan was responsible for about 12 million planning indicators (Nove, 1980). The U-form
organization was also replicated at the level of individual ministries: ministries were organized in functional
departments overseeing extremely specialized production units. In contrast to the Soviet Union, central
planning in China was organized mainly along territorial lines. Regional governments were responsible for
the whole array of production in their region. Typically, the production of each region was diversified and
relatively self-contained (Granick, 1990; Qian and Xu, 1993). Therefore, the Chinese economy can be viewed
as one gigantic M-form where each region resembles a division in an M-form corporation. With regional
governments taking major responsibilities for coordinating tasks across industries, the central government’s
role in coordination was greatly reduced. Indeed the number of planning indicators for which the State
Planning Commission at the Chinese central government was responsible never exceeded 1,000 (Qian and
Xu, 1993).
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The performance of the metallurgy industry in these two economies is consistent with the prediction of
our model as well. Indeed, the model predicts that when p is high enough, the U-form will perform better
than the M-form due to its advantages in specialization. The metallurgy industry in the Soviet economy
was organized in functionalised ministries each specialized in one type of metal, such as iron and steel,
other ferrous metals, or non-ferrous metals. The whole steel industry was coordinated by the Ministry
of Iron and Steel and the organizational structure of the ministry was very similar to those of large steel
companies in the United States, such as that of the US Steel. Under the ministry, tasks were further
divided in functionalised departments, such as Production Department, Special Steel Department, Mining
Department, Coke Department etc., and these departments supervised specialized enterprises. (Clark, 1956).
Moreover, there had been a trend toward further specialization in the industry after World War II (Bannei,
1984).The Soviet U-form of central planning was conducive to quite extraordinary growth in the metallurgy
industry. In fact, Soviet steel output increased at one of the highest speeds in the world and, starting
from a moderate level, achieved the highest level in the world in a short period of time. It increased from
14.5 million tons in 1947 to 102 million tons in 1967 in twenty years; and further increased to 147 million
tons in 1977 (Pockney, 1991). In China, specialization in metallurgy was less developed. There was only
one ministry, the Ministry of Metallurgy Industry, to take care of the tasks that were handled by several
ministries in the Soviet Union. Except for few large steel firms which were under the control of both this
Ministry and regional governments, most steel firms were medium sized (each producing less than 1 million
ton annually) and under the control of regional governments. The industry was not specialized even at the
provincial level and larger steel companies were self-contained as a rule. The Chinese M-form of central
planning did not fare well in metallurgy. Starting from an output level comparable to that of the Soviet
Union in 1947, the Chinese achieved only half of what the Soviet Union achieved within the same length of
time: steel output increased from 13.3 million tons in 1969 to 61.6 million tons in 1989 (National Statistical
Bureau, 1983 and 1990). This poor performance is not easily explained by other factors. For example,
it is well documented that the Chinese government has put the highest priority on the development of the
steel industry since the 1950s. Moreover, there is no evidence of lack of resources. In fact, China has
the world’s largest coal reserves and fairly large iron ore reserves. Until the mid 1990s the Chinese iron ore
production grew above 10% annually and the proportion of imported iron ore in total iron ore consumption
was marginal.
The evidence from the US and from centrally planned economies is complementary. Competition in a
market economy drives firms to adopt organizational forms that improve efficiency. In metallurgy, this was
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the case of the U-form. The comparison between the Soviet Union and China where the organizational form
was fixed under central planning confirms the higher efficiency of the U-form in metallurgy industry in the
Soviet Union.
We next provide some evidence on the second prediction. We compare the features of agricultural
reforms in the Soviet Union and China. Agricultural reforms in both countries were centered on land reform
to replace collective farming by household farming. Whereas technological innovation in agriculture is likely
to feature a relatively high p, things are different with economic reform in agriculture. Although household
farming is a common practice in market economies, one can argue that agricultural reform involves a high
uncertainty and thus a lower probability of success p. Depending on the reform blueprint, the use rights of
land may be partly delegated to households for a short time period or they may be leased to households for
a longer period of time. Alternatively, ownership of land may be transferred to households altogether. These
different types of contracts have different incentive effects on households but also have different risk-bearing
implications. Leasing contracts entail weaker incentives but do not impose big risks on households. While
full ownership transfer gives higher incentives, it also imposes bigger risks. As the government is not fully
aware of the exact tradeoff between incentives and risk-bearing ability of households (which in turn depend
on other institutions in place), there is uncertainty about the effects of each type of contract. Blueprint
uncertainty thus relates to the uncertainty about farmers’ preferences and to the effects of existing risk-
sharing arrangements. However, there is also uncertainty about complementary reforms, such as reforms to
improve the legal protection of private property rights. If these complementary reforms are not successful, this
may negatively impact agricultural reform. Like industry, farming in the Soviet economy and in China were
also organized as U-form and M-form. In the 1980s, farming tasks were divided among 11 ministries in the
Soviet Union (Wegren, 1998). These tasks were coordinated by the central government through specialized
ministries. Tractors were provided centrally by the so-called MTS stations. The tasks of providing inputs
to the farmers, of managing their operations, storage, processing, transport, road infrastructure were all
allocated to separate agencies over which collective farms had no control. Warehouses and processing plants
were more likely to be located hundreds of kilometers away from farms (van Atta, 1993). Any change in
grain production had to involve at least seven ministries: Ministries of Agriculture, Trade, Cereal and Grain
Production, Tractors and Farm Machinery, Food Industry, Rural Construction, and Fertilizer. Any farm
(private or collective) that changed crops from grain to vegetable production would have had to deal with
these ministries plus other two ministries: Land Reclamation and Water Resources, and Fruit and Vegetable
Farming. Regional governments did not have the authority to solve the coordination problems. Therefore
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farmers were dependent on different ministries and there were substantial problems particularly waste at the
storage, transport and processing stages due to failures in coordination between production units, transport
and storage (Wädekin, 1992). In contrast, In China, relatively self-contained regional governments (i.e.,
provinces, counties, and townships) were responsible for farming.
Consistent with the prediction of our model, under the U-form, the Soviet agricultural reform was im-
plemented in the whole country. In 1989, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party decided
under Gorbachev’s impulsion to launch a nationwide agricultural reform whereby farmers could lease land
with long term contracts up to 50 years. In comparison, Chinese agricultural reform started with small
scale experiments in the late 1970s in a couple of counties in Anhui Province and Sichuan Province, out
of more than 2,000 counties in the country. The experimenting county governments were responsible for
coordinating the reforms. Following the success of the pioneering experiments, the scale of the experiments
was expanded and many other counties and other provinces implemented similar reform programs in later
years. In 1980 about 14 percent of Chinese rural households became household farmers whereas the per-
centage was increased to 45 and 80 in 1981 and 1982 respectively. In 1984 when more than 98 percent of
households became private farmers, the collective farming system was officially abandoned by the Chinese
central government (Naughton, 1995).
We now give an example of full scale experimentation under the M-form when p is relatively high. The
example concerns the ”dual-track approach” in price liberalization in China. Price liberalization is essential
in any market oriented reform, and it involves uncertainty. In 1984, the Chinese government adopted a
novel dual-track approach under which previously planned quantities and prices were maintained while at
the same time markets were liberalized at the margin, so that the two prices coexisted. With this approach p
is relatively high because only transactions at the margin are affected by the market price and inframarginal
transactions are not. The resistance to reform was minimal as the planned sector was left unchanged and no
one would thus lose from the reform (Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000). Despite the fact that China is known for
its tendency to conduct small-scale experiments in reform, in this particular case, the Chinese government
implemented the dual-track liberalization in all provinces and in all sectors within a very short time period.
This is an example of full-scale experimentation consistent with our model.
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8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyzed issues of coordination in M-form and U-form organizations. M-form organiza-
tions are partitioned in self-contained units where complementary tasks are grouped together whereas in
U-form organizations similar tasks are grouped together in specialized units. These different organizational
forms have different implications for coordination of tasks inside the organizations. M-form organizations
perform better in “attribute matching” between complementary tasks whereas U-form organizations have
an advantage in specialization and can exploit the externalities between similar tasks which leads to better
“attribute compatibility.” These differences in organizational forms have interesting dynamic implications
in terms of propensities to experiment with innovations. The M-form has the flexibility of using small scale
experimentation, a possibility that is absent in the U-form due to the complications of coordination in at-
tribute matching arising from its higher level of specialization. Small scale experimentation is particularly
beneficial in the M-form when innovations are uncertain in the sense that they have a low probability of
success. When innovations have a high probability of success, full scale experimentation is better and the
U-form can dominate the M-form due to its advantage in specialization. We present evidence from the U.S.
and from central planning in China and the Soviet Union that is consistent with the predictions of the model.
We would like to indicate one avenue for further research, that is, the change of the organizational form
itself. In the paper, we have treated the organizational forms as given and compared their static and dynamic
properties. But we have not formally analyzed the ”life cycle” of organizations such as the gradual shift from
the U-form to the M-form in business organizations documented by Chandler. Although the comparative
statics from Section 5 may partly shed light on this issue by showing that an increase in the number of
functions and complexity of products may give an advantage to the M-form despite the economies of scale
of the U-form, more work is needed to understand the dynamics of organizational change.
Such organizational dynamics becomes even more complex in government organizations as compared to
business organizations since political economy issues play a role on top of efficiency. Thus, for example, the
reasons for why the Soviet Union did not manage to change from the U-form to the M-form organization
are in part due to politics. In fact, such a change actually occurred under Khrushchev in the late 1950s and
early 1960s but the latter was deposed and the U-form organization was reinstated afterwards. Therefore,
understanding the reasons for change (or its absence) of organizational forms of government will have to
incorporate political economy considerations.
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9 Appendix 1. The One-Shot Experiment Model
In this Appendix we modify the original model in the following way: instead of assuming a continuous flow
of experiment programs available over time, we allow for only one experiment program to be available. If
this program is bad or not successfully implemented, the organization will revert back to the old way. For
simplicity, we assume away the compatibility problem (i.e., s = 1) and focus on the coordination problem
only.
In this one-shot experiment model, the status quo (i.e., no experimentation) payoff under both the M-form
and the U-form remains to be V S = R1−δ ,where δ is the discount factor.
In the M-form, under the full-scale experimentation strategy, the payoff at stage 0 becomes
VMFo = −C + p
2R
1− δ + (1− p
δR
1− δ )
= −C + R
1− δ [2p+ δ(1− p)].
In the U-form, under the full-scale experimentation strategy, the payoff at stage 0 becomes
V UFo = −
C
2
+ p
µ
2λ2R
1− δ +
2(1− λ2)δR
1− δ
¶
+ (1− p)
µ
δR
(1− δ)
¶
= −C
2
+
R
(1− δ)
¡
[2λ2 + (1− λ2)δ]p+ δ(1− p)
¢
In the M-form, the payoff at stage 0 under the small-scale experimentation strategy is given by
VMSo = −
C
2
+ p
µ
3R
2
− δC
2
+
2δR
1− δ
¶
+ (1− p)
µ
R
2
+
δR
1− δ
¶
= −C(1 + pδ)
2
+
R
1− δ [p+
1 + δ
2
].
Note that the three payoff functions are somewhat different from the ones derived from the original model.
We define the critical value pMF such that VMFo =
R
1−δ , the critical value p
UF such that V UFo =
R
1−δ , and
the critical value pMS such that VMSo = V
S = R1−δ . We derive that: p
MF = (R+C)(1−δ)R(2−δ) , p
UF =
(R+C2 )(1−δ)
λ2R(2−δ) ,
and pMS = (R+C)(1−δ)2R−δ(1−δ)C .The three critical values are exactly the same as in the original model. We now
calculate the payoff difference between the M-form under the small-scale experimentation strategy and the
M-form under the full-scale experimentation strategy:
VMSo − VMFo =
1
1− δ
µ
(1− pδ)C
2
− (p− 1
2
)R
¶
.
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Again, it is the same expression as in the original model. It is easy to derive that ∂∂pV
MF
o >
∂
∂pV
MS
o > 0.
We define p∗ such that VMFo = VMSo , from which we derive p∗ =
C+R
δC+2R . Again, it has the same
expression as in the original model.
We define ep such that V UFo (λ = 1) = VMSo and obtain ep = R2R+δC . Again, it has the same expression as
in the original model.
The reason that all the critical values have the identical expressions as in the original model is that the
costs and benefits are comparable on a per period basis. We conclude that all the results from the original
model with a continuum of experimentation over time remain under the one-shot experimentation model.
10 Appendix 2. U-Formwith Small-Scale Experimentation Across
Units
Consider a strategy where the experiment applies to task 1A in unit 1 and task 2A in unit 2 in the U-form.
The experimentation is thus carried out across the two units, but applied to the same product A. This is a
bit like the experiment in the M-form, in the sense that only product A is affected first by the experiment,
not product B. We can write the recursive formula for the payoff at stage i in terms of the net present value
V USi :
V USi = −
C
2
+p{λ2[ (i+ 2)R
2
+
(i+ 1)R
2
+δV USi+1 ]+
¡
1− λ2
¢
(
iR
2
+
(i+ 1)R
2
+δV USi )}+(1− p)
µ
iR
2
+
(i+ 1)R
2
+ δV USi
¶
.
Let a = 1
1−(1−λ2p)δ . We have
V USi = a[−
C
2
+ λ2p
µ
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3
2
¶
R+ [p
¡
1− λ2
¢
+ (1− p)](R
2
+ iR) + λ2pδV USi+1 ]
= −aC
2
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R
2
+ aRi+ aλ2pδV USi+1 .
From the above recursive formula, we calculate
V USo = −a
C
2
∞X
i=0
¡
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,
where V USo is finite because aλ
2pδ = λ
2pδ
1−(1−λ2p)δ < 1 for all δ < 1. We obtain the payoff at stage 0:
V USo = −
C
2(1− δ) +
R
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µ
1
2
+
pλ2
(1− δ)
¶
.
32
To compare the relative advantage of the small-scale experimentation strategy under Formulation 1 with
the full-scale experimentation strategy in the U-form, we calculate the difference in payoffs and obtain:
Proposition Under the U-form, the payoff difference between the small-scale and the full-scale experimen-
tation strategy is given by
V USo − V UFo =
R
1− δ
µ
1
2
− pλ2
¶
.
The relative advantage of the small-scale over the full-scale strategy is larger when p or λ is smaller.
The trade-off between the small-scale and the full-scale experimentation strategies under the U-form is
similar to that under the M-form, with an important difference on the option value part. Comparing the
above expression with VMSo − VMFo = 11−δ
¡
(1− pδ)C2 + (
1
2 − p)R
¢
,we found that under the U-form, the
small-scale experimentation strategy does not have the option value of waiting as compared with the full-
scale experimentation strategy. The relative advantage is then completely determined by the term 12 − pλ
2.
When pλ2 > 12 , it is the cost of delaying experiment in the entire organization. When pλ
2 < 12 , it is the
cost saving from the delay, because the success chance of the experiment is too small.
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